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Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. and the 1994
Amendments: Is Joint and Several Liability Really
Dead in Utah?*
I.

INTRODUCfiON

It was the Utah Supreme Court's 1993 case of Sullivan v. Scoular
Grain Co. 1 which finally articulated how to judge the effect of immune
parties within Utah's comparative negligence scheme. Before Sullivan,
this area of Utah tort law was unresolved and in fact articulated two
separate-and wholly incompatible-means for judging immune parties'
impact when determining the percentage fault of non-immune defendants.
The two acts which offered different schemes for determining tort
remedies when immune parties are involved were the Utah Liability
Reform Ace and the Workers' Compensation Act. 3
The case's central question was whether parties who were immune
from suit under the Workers' Compensation Statute4 should be included
on the special verdict form for the apportionment of fault, as allowed by
the Utah comparative negligence scheme. 5 In resolving the differing
compensation schemes offered by two acts, the court held that immune
parties may be included on the jury form but that this was not to affect
the exclusive remedy of the Workers' Compensation Act. 6
The Sullivan decision not only resolved an area where Utah laws
were incompatible, it also set the stage for legislative amendments to the
then-irreconcilable acts. 7 This 1994legislation was entitled the Workers'
Compensation and Liability Reform Act Amendments 8 ("the 1994

* Copyright <D 1995 by Lee Edwards.
1. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993).
2. Utah Liability Reform Act of 1986, ch. 199, 1986 Utah Laws 470 (codified at UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 to -43, -53 (1992 & Supp. 1994)).
3. Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 100, 1917 Utah Laws 306 (codified in scattered
sections of UTAH CODE ANN. Title 35) (originally established the Industrial Commission of
Utah and the workers' compensation scheme. It was amended many times prior to the 1994
amendments relevant to this note).
4. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62 (1994).
5. ld. § 78-27-39 (Supp. 1994).
6. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 880-81 (Utah 1993).
7. Workers' Compensation and Liability Reform Act Amendments, ch. 221, 1994 Utah
Laws 1021 (codified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62, 78-27-37 to -41).
8. ld.
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Amendments"). It was passed "[i]n the waning hours of the 1994 Utah
Legislative Session, [as] Senate Bill No. 224, [which was] a compromise
engineered by the Governor. " 9 The new legislation allowed immune
entities to be included on the special verdict form. It also created the
requirement that the fault attributable to immune parties be 40% or
greater before the immune party could be included in the overall
apportionment process under the Utah comparative negligence scheme. 10
This note will review the historical background of the statutes
affected by the 1994 Amendments; the court's analysis of Sullivan; and
the 1994 Amendments and the effects of their 40% threshold for fault
allocation. This note will further suggest the need for careful consideration-and prescience-on the part of the litigator when an immune party
is involved in the suit. Under the 1994 Amendments the amount of
damages for which the non-immune defendant can be liable can largely
depend on which side of the 40% threshold the immune party falls.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

The Workers' Compensation Act

The Workers' Compensation Act, originally passed in 1917, created
a no-fault compensation system for workers in the state of Utah.U The
Act provides an exclusive remedy for an employee against an employer
in a negligence action, 12 abrogating an employee's common law right to
sue his or her employer for injuries suffered while in the course of
employment. 13 The Act states: "The right to recover compensation
pursuant to the provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive
remedy against the employer. " 14

B.

The Liability Reform Act

Sixty years following the passage of the Workers' Compensation Act,
the move toward comparative negligence in Utah began. In 1973 Utah
abolished contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery in a
negligence action and retained the doctrine of joint and several liabili-

9. Tim D. Dunn & W. Brent Wilcox, Significant Changes in Comparative Fault and
Workers' Compensation Reimbursement, UTAH B.J., Aug.-Sept. 1994, at 8.
10. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-39(2)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1994).
11. ld. §35-1-60(1994).
12. ld.
13. Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 191 P.2d 612, 616 (Utah),
appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866 (1948).
14. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-60 (1994).
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ty. 15 Under the common law, the doctrine of joint and several liability
"holds joint tortfeasors responsible for plaintiff's entire injury, allowing
plaintiff to pursue all, some, or one of the tortfeasors responsible for his
injury for the full amount of damages. " 16
But Utah was not long a joint and several liability state. In 1986 the
legislature passed the Liability Reform Actl 7 which abolished joint and
several liability 18 by requiring that "no defendant [be] liable to any
person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of
fault attributed to that defendant. " 19 Further, the Act defined a defendant as a person not immune from suit who is "claimed to be liable
because of fault to any person seeking recovery. " 20
III.

THE SUILNAN DECISION

The overlap of the doctrine of the immune employer found in Utah's
Worker's Compensation legislation with the state's comparative
negligence scheme gave rise to the Sullivan case. In this case, the court
addressed the issue of whether a defendant can be liable for more than the
fault attributable to it or if an immune party should be included in the
special verdict form in order to determine the immune party's percentage
of fault.
The facts of this 1986 case involved Kenneth Sullivan, an employee
of Scoular Grain Company, Freeport Center Associates, and Scoular
Grain Company of Utah (the Scoular parties), who lost his left arm and
left leg in an accident on the railroad tracks in Clearfield, Utah. 21
Sullivan brought suit against "the Scoular parties, Union Pacific Railroad
Company, Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, Oregon
Short Line Railroad Company, Utah Power & Light Company, Trackmobile, Inc., and G. W. Van Keppel Company. " 22
Of these parties the federal district court dismissed two. The Scoular
parties were dismissed on the grounds that they were immune from suit
under the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation

15.
16.
17.
at UTAH
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Liability Reform Act of 1973, ch. 209, 1973 Utah Laws 710.
Coney v. J.L.G. Indus. Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 204 (Ill. 1983).
Liability Reform Act of 1986, ch. 199, 1986 Utah Laws 470 (codified as amended
CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -43, -53 (1992 & Supp. 1994)).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (Supp. 1994).
ld. § 78-27-38(3).
ld. § 78-27-37(1) (Supp. 1994).
Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1993).
ld.
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Act. 23 The court dismissed Denver & Rio Grand Western Railroad
because it found that no duty was owed to the Plaintiff. 24
But after these immune parties were dismissed, defendant Trackmobile moved to have these defendants included on the special verdict
form. While Trackmobile understood the immune defendants could not
ultimately be held liable, by asking that they be included on the special
verdict form, Trackmobile sought, "to have the jury apportion and
compare the fault of all the originally named defendants. " 25 This
presumably would tend to decrease the damages for which Trackmobile
could ultimately be found liable.

A.

Immune Employers

To determine whether immune employers, such as the Scoular parties
in Sullivan, should be included on the special verdict form, the court
stated its standard for statutory interpretation: "The court's principal duty
in interpreting statutes is to determine legislative intent, and the best
evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. " 26 The
court then looked to the definition of "defendant" in the comparative
negligence statute as well as language elsewhere in the statute which gave
an sense of which parties might be included in that definition. 27 As
defined by the comparative negligence statute, a defendant is "any person
not immune from suit who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any
person seeking recovery. " 28 This definition, the court acknowledged,
would seemed to preclude the inclusion of immune parties on the special
verdict form. 29
However, the court found that this interpretation directly conflicted
with language of two other sections of the comparative fault provision.

23. /d. The section providing an exclusive remedy against an employer by an employee
is UTAH CODE ANN. § 3'5-1-60 (Supp. 1994).
24. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 878-79.
25. ld. at 879.
26. ld. (citing Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah
1984)). However, it is interesting to note that if this standard is strictly applied, the plain language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(1) could also preclude immune parties from being
included on the special verdict form because they are not "defendants" as defined by the
statute. Moreover, a different inference could be given to §§ 78-27-38 and -40 so as to apply
only to parties that fall within the definition of "defendant." Under that analysis, non-immune
parties are only ensured that they will be liable for the proportionate share of fault as against
other non-immune parties. Therefore, the conflict could be avoided by applying the plain
language of the definition of "defendant." See Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 885 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
27. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 879.
28. ld. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(1)).
29. ld.
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One section stated, "[n]o defendant is liable to any person seeking
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to
that defendant. " 30 Another section of the statute added, "the maximum
amount for which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking
recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the
percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant. " 31 Given
the apparent statutory contradiction, the court reasoned that if the immune
entity was not included in the apportionment process and some fault was
attributable to it, the third party defendant would be liable "in excess of
[its] proportion of fault. " 32
The court gave the following hypothetical as an example of the effect
of the statute if immune entities were not included on the special verdict
form: "[I]f the Scoular parties were 90% at fault and the defendants
remaining in the action were 10% at fault, the remaining defendants
would be apportioned 100% of any damages awarded even though they
were only 10% at fault. " 33 In essence, this would have made the thirdparty defendants jointly and severally liable for the fault of the immune
party.
The court then stated a second rule of statutory interpretations noting
that "[t]he primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the
intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to
achieve. " 34 The preliminary drafts of Senate Bill 64 (later the Liability
Reform Act of 1986?5 stated in the title that one of the purposes of the
legislation was to "[abolish] joint and several liability. " 36 Furthermore,
in the bill's legislative history, one Senator had stated that "it is the basic
fairness concept we're driving at. The defendant ought to be on the hook
only for its own percentage of damages, but ought not be the guarantor
for everyone else's damages. " 37
Therefore, unless the immune parties were included in the apportionment process, the "[legislative intent] would be frustrated" and "joint and
several liability would result. " 38 The court held that "[a] jury may
apportion the fault of employers under [the Liability Reform Act]

30. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (Supp. 1994).
31. /d. § 78-27-40.
32. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 879.
33. /d.
34. /d. at 880 (quoting Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991)).
35. Liability Reform Act of 1986, ch. 199, 1986 Utah Laws 470 (codified at UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -43, -53 (1992 & Supp. 1994)).
36. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 880.
37. /d.
38. /d.
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notwithstanding their immunity under [the Workers' Compensation
Act]. " 39
Although the court held that immune parties must be included on the
jury form, it stated that the inclusion of the party does not affect the
exclusive remedy of the Workers' Compensation Act. 40 The court held
that the "[a]pportionment of fault does not of itself subject the employer
to civil liability. Rather, the apportionment process merely ensures that
no defendant is held liable to any claimant for an amount of damages in
excess of the percentage of fault attributable to that defendant. " 41
Not only did the ruling leave the exclusive remedy of workers'
compensation against the employer intact, it also left the employer with
the full right to subrogate any claim the employee had against a third
party for any benefits paid under workers' compensation. In reaching
this decision, the court examined the laws of other jurisdictions and
equitable considerations such as the fact that if the employee's claim is
less than the workers' compensation benefits, the employee will take
nothing in the action against the third party. 42

B.

Dismissed Nonemployer Defendants

In considering Trackmobile's motion for inclusion of Denver & Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company, the party dismissed on the merits,
the court again considered the definitions in the Liability Reform Act.
The Act defines "defendant" as "any person not immune from suit who
is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery. " 43 The Act also defines "fault" as "any actionable breach of legal
duty, act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or
damages. " 44 The court recognized that "actionable" may be interpreted
so that "the Act's definition of fault does not necessarily preclude the
apportionment of fault of nonparties. " 45 Nevertheless, the court held
that "[since] the exclusion [of the dismissed party] will not subject the
remaining defendants to potential liability for damage in excess of their
proportionate fault," the nonemployer defendants that were dismissed
based on an adjudication on the merits, could not be included on the
special verdict form. 46

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

ld. at 884.
ld. at 880-881.
ld. at 878.
See supra part III. C.
Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 883 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(1), (2) (1986)).
ld.
ld. at 884.
ld.
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The Effect of the Holding

Given the court's position regarding the immune employers and nonemployers, the result of the holding in this case can be quite harsh on the
plaintiff and may allow an "at fault employer to escape liability altogether
at the expense of the injured employee. " 47 This is because:
[When] an injured employee receives a judgment from a third-party
defendant which is less than or equal to what the plaintiff receives in
workers' compensation payments, the employee must subrogate the
entire amount to the employer. In such a case, the employer or its insurer will pay little or nothing even though a large percentage of the
fault is attributable to the employer. 48

Justice Durham, writing for the majority, recognized the outcome
could be inequitable and that the meaning of the statutory language,
requiring that each defendant only be held liable for their relative portions
of fault, is clear. 49 Recognizing this inequity, the majority referred to
the need for legislative action to resolve the statutory conflict, stating
"[The] plaintiff's remedy on this point is a legislative one. " 50 In
subsequent cases which followed the Sullivan precedent/1 there was also
a clear message for legislative resolution from the court. Both the
majority and dissent in these later cases confirmed the need for legislative
change. 52

IV.

THE

1994

AMENDMENTS

The Workers' Compensation and Liability Reform Act Amendments
of 199453 were a response to the court's suggestion that a change in the
legislation in this area was needed. 54 The bill was drafted by the
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah and supported by the Utah Trial

47. /d. at 883.
48. Geoffrey C. Haslam, Apportioning the Comparative Fault of Non-party Joint
Tortjeasors, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 444, 450.
49. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 883.
50. /d.
51. See Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993); Brown v. RoyerWashington Boulevard Assocs., 856 P.2d 352 (Utah 1993).
52. See Brown, 856 P.2d at 355. (Durham, J., concurring, "I hope that the legislature
will address the issue." Stewart, J., dissenting, "It appears that the Legislature ought to
readdress the issue.").
53. Workers' Compensation and Liability Reform Act Amendments, ch. 221 , 1994 Utah
Laws 1021 (codified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-62, 78-27-37 to -41 (Supp.
1994)).
54. See supra note 52.
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Association which would have effectively overruled the Sullivan
decision. 55 Various interests including the Manufacturer's Association,
the insurance industry and large corporations opposed this bill "apparently ... willing to take an increase in workers' compensation premiums
in return for having less third party tort liability. " 56
The final 1994 Amendments allow a party immune from suit to be
included on the special verdict form. 57 However, the Amendments treat
the immune party differently depending on whether or not fault allocated
is greater or less than 40% .58
The statute makes clear that the exclusive remedy through workers'
compensation is to remain in place and that the immune employer is only
included on the special verdict form for purposes of apportionment:
The apportionment of fuult to the employer in a civil action against a
third party is not an action at law and does not impose any liability on
the employer. The apportionment of fuult does not alter or diminish the
exclusiveness of the remedy provided to employees, their heirs, or
personal representatives, or the immunity provided employers pursuant
to Section 35-1-60 for injuries sustained by an employee, whether
resulting in death or not. Any court in which a civil action is pending
shall issue a partial summary judgment to an employer with respect to
the employer's immunity as provided in Section 35-1-60 [regarding the
exclusive remedy of workers' compensation], even though the conduct
of the employer may be considered in allocating fuult to the employer
in a third party action in the manner provided in [the comparative fuult
sections]. 59

Only following the apportionment process is the immune defendant then
treated differently, depending on whether or not the fault apportioned to
that defendant is greater or less than 40% . 60

A.

When the Fault of the Immune Entity is Less than 40%

If the jury apportions less than 40% of fault to the immune parties:

55. Dunn & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 10.
56. /d. For a discussion regarding why workers' compensation premiums would likely
rise both in the 1994 Amendments and in the bill supported by the Manufacturer's Association
see infra part IV. C and note 85 and accompanying text.
57. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-39(1) (Supp. 1994).
58. /d. § 78-27-39(2)(a)-(b).
59. /d. § 35-1-62(6) (1994).
60. Compare id. § 78-27-39(2)(a) (Supp. 1994 )(stating the effect of apportionment when
fault is less than 40%) with § 78-27-39(2)(b) (stating the effect of apportionment when fault is
40% or more) and § 35-1-62(5)(b)(i)-(ii) ( 1994) (regarding the right of reimbursement of the
self insured employer or carrier). These sections taken together attempt to remedy the harsh
effect of the decision as discussed infra part III.C.
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the trial court shall reduce that percentage or proportion of fuult to zero
and reallocate that percentage or proportion of fuult to the other parties
in proportion to the percentage or proportion of fuult initially attributed
to each party by the filet finder. After this reallocation, cumulative
fuult shall equal 100% with the persons immune from suit being allocated no fuult. 61

For example, if the jury apportions 30% of fault to the immune
parties, and there are two non-immune third party defendants each receiving 35% of the fault, the immune parties fault would be reduced to zero
and re-allocated among the non-immune third party defendants. In this
situation, each third party defendant would be liable for 50% of the
damages. 62 Since the remaining fault is reallocated among the parties,
to a certain extent, this effectively makes the third-party defendants
jointly and severally liable for the amount of the employers' fault.
When the fault of the immune entity is less than 40%, the employee
is required to reimburse the employer or insurer for the full amount of
workers' compensation benefits, "without reduction" less the proportionate share of costs and attorneys' fees. 63 The portion of the statute
relating to reimbursement is substantially the same as the holding in the
Sullivan case except that full reimbursement is now required only if the
immune entities' fault is less than 40%.
Therefore, applying the reimbursement requirement to the previous
example, when the immune employer's fault is 30% the employer or the
insurance carrier has a right to full reimbursement of workers' compensation benefits (less the reasonable proportionate share of attorneys' fees)
even though the employer shares a percentage of the fault. For example,
if the immune employer's fault is determined to be 30% and if there are
two third parties each being 35% at fault (resulting in 100% of fault), the
employer's fault would be reallocated, 64 and each third party would be
liable for 50%. If there were $100,000 in damages and the employeeplaintiff received $10,000 in workers' compensation benefits, the
employee-plaintiff would have a judgement of $50,000 from each third
party defendant subrogated to a claim for reimbursement for $10,000 by
the employer under the Workers' Compensation Statute. 65 Generally,
"[the] common-law doctrine of joint and several liability holds joint
tortfeasors responsible for plaintifFs entire injury, allowing plaintiff to

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-39(2)(a) (Supp. 1994).
This hypothetical assumes that no fault is attributed to the plaintiff.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62(5)(a)-(b) (1994).
ld. § 78-27-39(2)(a) (Supp. 1994).
ld. § 35-1-62(5)(b)(i) (1994).
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pursue all, some, or one of the tortfeasors responsible for his injury for
full amount of the damages. " 66 Under the 1994 Amendments, because
fault is reallocated among the existing non-immune parties when the fault
attributable to the immune parties is less than 40%, the third party
defendant is jointly and severally liable for the immune parties' proportionate fault after reallocation. 67 While the non-immune parties are not
liable for the plaintiff's "entire injury," they will share jointly and
severally in the immune parties amount of damages.
Notably, the jury may not be told that if they allocate less than 40%
of the fault to the immune defendants the third-party defendants may be
liable for more than their proportionate share of fault. The statute states,
"[t]he jury may not be advised of the effect of any reallocation under
[this Section]. " 68 In the end, when the employers fault is less than
40%, the 1994 Amendments maintain a true no-fault worker compensation system as enacted in 1917. 69

B.

When the Fault of the Immune Entity is Greater than 40%

If the jury determines that the fault of the immune entity that was
included on the special verdict form is greater than or equal to 40
percent, the 1994 Amendments paint a much different picture. In these
circumstances, "that percentage or proportion of fault attributed to
persons immune from suit may not be reduced [and reallocated]." 70
Although the immune employer's fault is not reduced, this does not
subject the immune employer to liability based on the allocation of
fault. 71 It simply guarantees "the maximum amount for which a
defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage
or proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion
of fault attributed to that defendant. " 72
For example, if the jury apportions 70% of the fault to the immune
employer and 30% to the non-immune third party defendants and the

66. Coney v. J.L.G. Indus. Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 204 (Ill. 1983).
67. If there is more than one third party defendant, the defendants are not jointly and
severally liable for each others fault, however they are jointly and severally liable against the
immune party.
68. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-39(2)(c)(i) (Supp. 1994).
69. Workers' Compensation Act of 1917, ch. 100, 1917 Utah Laws 306.
70. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-39(2)(b) (Supp. 1994).
71. /d. § 78-27-38. But cf id. § 35-l-62(5)(b)(ii) (1994) (the right to reimbursement by
self-insuring employer or insurance carrier is reduced by the proportionate share of fault).
72. ld. § 78-27-40(1) (Supp. 1994). Another part of the statute reiterates the fact that
"[a] defendant or person seeking recovery may not bring a civil action against any person
immune from suit to recover damages resulting in the allocation of fault." ld. § 78-27-40(3).
This attempts to maintain the integrity of the no-fault Workers' Compensation Act.
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damages are $100,000, the plaintiff may recover $30,000 from the thirdparty defendant and the employer doesn't have a right to full subrogation
of workers' compensation benefits paid to the plaintiff employee. 73 In
this case, the non-immune third-party defendant is only liable for the
proportion of damages equivalent to the percentage of fault attributed to
that defendant ($30,000). 74 Therefore, in this situation, damages are not
shared jointly and severally among the non-immune parties for the fault
of the immune employer.
The court may advise the jury that "fault attributed to persons
immune from suit may reduce the award of the person seeking recovery. " 75 In fact, it may be in the plaintiff's and the immune employer's
best interest to request these instructions in order to influence the jury
and bring the fault of the immune employer under the 40% threshold.
If fault of the immune entity is less than 40%, the plaintiff would have
full recovery from the non-immune third-party defendants 76 and the
employer would have the right to full reimbursement for the workers'
compensation benefits. 77 By allowing the inclusion of immune parties
in fault allocation, this substantially codifies the holding in Sullivan when
the fault attributable to the immune party is equal to or greater than
40%. 78
This being the case, the 1994 Amendments still made significant
changes regarding the right to reimbursement under the Workers'
Compensation Statute. 79 The Sullivan decision discussed the detrimental
effect of the reimbursement right to the plaintiff prior to the 1994
Amendments: "[A]n employer or insurer [could] obtain reimbursement
for any payments made to an injured employee. This lien is not reduced
in any respect by the amount by which the employer's act or omission
contributed to the employee's injuries." 80 After the 1994 Amendments,
when the fault of the immune employer is 40% or greater, the employer
or employer's insurer (after an accounting for the share of attorneys'

73. See id. § 78-27-39 (disallowing reduction and reallocation). See also id. § 35-162(5)(b)(ii) (allowing for subrogation limited by the employer's percentage of fault).
74. See id. § 78-27-40(1) (Supp. 1994).
75. /d. § 78-27-39(2)(c)(ii).
76. See id. § 78-27-39(2)(a) (reducing the fault of the immune entity to zero and reallocating the fault among the third party defendants).
77. See id. § 35-1-62(5)(b)(i) (1994) (allowing reimbursement without reduction when
the fault attributable to the immune employer is less than 40%).
78. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1993).
79. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62 (1994).
80. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 883 (discussing the reimbursement provision of UTAH CODE
ANN. § 35-1-62 (1992)); see also supra part III.C (regarding the potentially harsh portents of
the decision for employers).
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fees) 81 is entitled to reimbursement, "[subtracting] the amount of
payments made multiplied by the percentage of fault attributed to the
employer, officer, agent, or employee of the employer in the action
against the third party. " 82 Therefore, as in the previous example, if the
employer is 70% at fault and the payments were $10,00083 the employer
would have the right of reimbursement "for the payments made [$10,000]
... less the [product of the] amount of payments made [$10,000]
multiplied by the percentage of fault [70%]. " 84 The original amount
($10,000) would therefore be reduced by $7000, leaving the employer or
insurance carrier with a right of reimbursement of $3000.
If the fault of the immune employer is likely to approach 40%, the
employer or insurer may wish to intervene rather than relying on the
plaintiff's case as specifically allowed in the 1994 Amendments. This is
because if fault of the employer is allocated under the 40% threshold the
employer will retain right to full reimbursement of workers' compensation benefits. 85

C.

Employer Intervention when Fault is Greater Than 40%

Because the interest of the employer or the employer's insurer in the
right to reimbursement for payments under the Workers' Compensation
Statute may be reduced if the fault attributed to the employer is greater
than or equal to 40%, the employer may want to intervene to protect his
or her interests. It has been suggested that
[the 1994 Amendments] still [require] the employer to defend those
cases where it believes it may have some exposure of having fuult in
excess of 40%, but it would not 'have to defend cases where it believes
it is below the threshold or it is willing to rely upon the plaintiff's case
as its defense. 86

The possible reduction in the right of reimbursement and the increase in
the cost of litigation are the reasons that workers' compensation
premiums will probably increase.

81. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62(5)(a) (1994).
82. ld. § 35-1-62(5)(b)(ii).
83. This hypothetical assumes that the proportionate share of attorneys' fees were already
accounted for according to § 35-1-62(5)(a) of the Utah Code.
84. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62(5)(b)(ii) (1994).
85. ld. § 78-27-41(3)(a)-(b)(Supp.1994). Thisispartofthereasonworkers'compensation premiums will likely increase and was part of the compromise discussed infra note 56 and
accompanying text. The legislature was apparently balancing an increase in workers'
compensation premiums against a possible increase in third-party tort Iiability.
86. Dunn & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 10.
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The 1994 Amendments specifically provide that the employer has the
right to intervene to protect his or her interest. "A person immune from
suit may intervene as a party under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, regardless of whether or not money damages are sought. " 87
The statute provides that the injured employee must give notice to the
employer or insurer of "any known attempt to attribute fault to the
employer. " 88 While the employer has the right to receive notice and
intervene in any case where his or her interests may be at stake, it is only
necessary to do so when the jury may apportion 40% or greater of the
fault to the employer.
This requires the attorney advising the client to predict the outcome
of the trial before the jury retires. The 1994 Amendments do "[make]
it more difficult to advise . . . clients as to what to expect out of the
eventual outcome of the case. " 89 Because jury verdicts are hard to
predict, the question of whether to intervene or not will require careful
consideration and prescience on the part of the litigator for non-immune
party defendant.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the end, the Sullivan case led to a substantial change in the Utah
comparative negligence scheme by influencing the legislature to enact the
1994 Amendments. The new threshold of 40% fault revived joint and
several liability for third party defendants when the fault attributed to the
immune party is less than 40%. Thus, the 1994 Amendments altered the
express purpose of the Liability Reform Act of 198690 by reviving a
form of joint and several liability in some circumstances. Because of the
interaction between the right to reimbursement under workers' compensation and the 40% threshold, counsel for the employer or the insurer must
make an educated guess as to the amount of fault the jury will apportion
to their client before determining whether or not to intervene.
Lee Edwards

87.
88.
89.
90.
at UTAH

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-41(3)(a) (Supp. 1994).
ld. § 35-1-62(3)(b) (1994).
Dunn & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 11.
Liability Reform Act of 1986, ch. 199, 1986 Utah Laws 470 (codified as amended
CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -43, -53 (Supp. 1994)).

